Abstract
Introduction
Today DRM is at the centre of everyone's attention for the worst reasons. A growing anti-DRM feeling is popping everywhere, and even content producers and copyright owners start looking to DRM with some doubts about its true usefulness in the protection of copyright. Apart from all the business aspects that driven DRM to this point, there are also some technology issues that have decisively contributed to this situation. One of these aspects is interoperability [13] .
DRM interoperability is a key technological aspect for the DRM success [2] . Currently, available DRM systems do not interoperate, causing the lack of coexistence between them and raising incompatibilities that affect the user's experience. A so many times cited example of this, is the incompatibility between the DRM platforms of Apple iTunes (Fairplay) and the Microsoft one (Windows Media DRM) [14] . A Fairplay governed digital object obtained in iTunes is incompatible with a Windows Media DRM compliant device and vice versa. This causes notorious setbacks to users, which have their rights restricted in a way that they will prevent them from being able to use its legal DRM-governed content wherever they wish. Currently there is no interoperability mechanism capable of allowing the usage of different DRM-governed digital objects over different DRM platforms.
Solving this interoperability issue is not an easy task. It involves many different aspects that cannot be solved out of the box. Moreover, most of the times, interoperability issues are driven by the business model than by technology itself. Nevertheless, in this article we will concentrate our attention of the technology issues, and to that matter aspects like device incompatibilities, different language expression, different content protection algorithms, different protocols, different key management, among other aspects [3] .
In this paper we will not address all the technical aspects of interoperability. We will focus in particular in the key management aspects of the different DRM solutions. Moreover, our analysis will be focused on open DRM platforms, a concept that we will introduce on this paper later on. Our approach for this paper will start from the identification of the different open DRM platforms, the description of the key management life cycle and how the different open DRM platforms handle this key management life cycle. Finally we will establish a comparison between them and identify which are the aspects of key management which are considered and others that are left behind.
Open DRM interoperability
As we have previously introduced, DRM interoperability is a challenging technical task and involves dealing with complex problems [13] . Some point the direction of the International Standardization to deal with the DRM interoperability problem [1] [15] [16] , indicating three different strategies for its achievement.
The first strategy is about full-format interoperability. This strategy requires that all the protected digital objects need to conform with some globally standardized and accepted format. This is hard to achieve, since all digital object and all the DRM system providers would have to reach an agreement about the same file format representation to use.
Connected interoperability is the second DRM interoperability strategy. In this strategy, third party translation entities would need to be used to translate operations from one DRM regime to another. This seems to have a more solid background and a set of translation entities are likely to exist in the future, for instance implementing web-services that will allow the translation between different DRM systems to accomplish the same objective -to enable DRM interoperability between different DRM providers. In this approach a peer-to-peer architecture is established in which each node allow an interface to its peers, and if it can't satisfy a direct request them redirects the search to other peers. Another approach is the "intermediated digital rights management" or brokerage mechanism, where are identified four tasks to be carried by the intermediary in transferring digital object in the format used by the content provider to the format required by the end-user. Rights management tasks are executed by a third party server (the intermediary) on behalf of the content scripts and endusers. The third and final strategy is configuration driven interoperability. Through the download of adequate tools any DRM system can get the ability to process governed digital objects on end users devices. This is also a more valid and viable alternative for the DRM interoperability problem allowing each device and each digital object rendering application to "extend" its own capabilities and functionalities to enable different DRM regimes according to the ones governing the protected digital object.
Full-format interoperability is the most advantageous for final users, affording a convenient way to enjoy and share digital objects. However, it is highly improbable that a universal format emerges that is suited to all the present and future needs of digital objects, applications and devices. Many others, in different fields have tried and failed [5] .
Figure 2. Broker-based DRM interoperability
The authors strongly believe that the best strategy for the DRM interoperability problem is to adopt connected interoperability. As we have presented, connected interoperability assumes two dimensions: a peer-to-peer connection ( Figure 1 ) between DRM solutions, or a generic broker mediated connection ( Figure 2 ) between different DRM solutions.
There are advantages and disadvantages in adopting one or the other approach. However, the broker-based DRM interoperability ( Figure 2 ) is a more generic approach to DRM interoperability, but it raises a lot more technical issues and complexities. Our approach to study DRM interoperability in this scenario will be as follows:
1. 
Key management in open DRM
Current initiatives that define DRM systems or the elements that are part of DRM systems, are specifying content formats, protection information, license creation and authorisation mechanisms based on licenses, authentication infrastructures, mechanisms for notifying the events within the system, among others. However, key management is not completely specified in most of the DRM systems and sometimes is forgotten or avoided, as for example in the MPEG-21 standard specification.
On the other hand, most of the DRM systems specify or chose an existing Rights Expression Language for declaring the rights and conditions that govern the use of the digital content. Nevertheless, they do not specify how sensible data within licenses can be protected or how licenses can be securely delivered to users.
Some of these DRM architectures are closed environments, only for issuing licenses and delivering content using internal servers, others are middle-ware interoperable systems which support relating each others in order to make better the user experience and easier business relations.
Such DRM architectures have been developed in order to work in a particular environment, using different controlled/non-controlled hardware devices so we can compare what is being done in terms of security in our environment.
In this section we will start by providing some information about general key management and key management life cycle.
Key management and key management life cycle
Key Management refers to the set of techniques and procedures supporting the establishment and maintenance of keying relationships between authorized parties [6] . Key Management encompasses a set of techniques and procedures for supporting:
 The initialization of users within a specific given domain;  Generation, distribution and installation of keying material;  Controlling the usage of keying material;  Update, revocation and destruction of keying material;  Storage, backup/recovery and archival of keying material.
The main objective of Key Management is to maintain keying relationships and keying material in a manner which counters relevant threats, such as:
 The compromise of secret keys;  The compromise of private and public keys;  The unauthorized use of secret or public keys. One of the main aspects of key management is the definition of a security policy. The security policy implicitly or explicitly defines the threats a system is intended to address [11] .
Security policies usually specify: 1. The practices and procedures to be followed in carrying out technical and administrative aspects of key management, both automated or manual; 2. The responsibilities and accountability of each of the party involved; 3. The types of records to be kept, to support subsequent reports or reviews of securityrelated events. The sequence of states which keying material progresses through over its lifetime is called the Key Management Life Cycle (Figure 3 ). There are three different keys stages within the life cycle:
 Pre-operational: The key is not yet available for formal cryptographic operations;  Operational: The key is available and in normal use;  Post-operational: The key is no longer in normal use, but off-line access to it is possible for special purposes; The different key management life cycle stages may include:
User registration: An entity becomes an authorized member of a security domain. This involves acquisition, or creation and exchange, of initial keying material such as shared passwords or PINs by a secure, one-time technique.
System and User initialization: System initialization involves setting up/ configuring a system for secure operation. User initialization involves the initialization of its cryptographic application.
Key generation: Generation of cryptographic material should include measures to ensure appropriate properties for the intended application or algorithm and randomness in the sense of being predictable with negligible probability. An entity may generate its own keys or acquire keys from a trusted system component.
Key installation: Keying material is installed for operational use when the software, hardware, system, application, crypto module, or device is initially set up, when new keying material is added to the existing keying material or when existing keying material is replaced. The test keying material must be replaced prior to operational use.
Key registration: Keying material is bound to information or attributes associated with a particular entity. This information may include the identity of the 
Analysis of key management life cycle on open DRM platforms
In the previous section we have described the key management and key management life cycle in general terms, which are applicable to any security-based system. In this section the authors will perform an analysis on how key management and key management life cycle is handled by different selected open DRM solutions.
As we have stated previously on this paper, we will consider on this analysis, only DRM solutions which are open. Our understanding of the word "open DRM" in the context of this paper, refers to DRM solutions with available public specifications and/or the source code is also available.
Therefore, we choose to consider the following DRM systems in our analysis: OpenSDRM, OpenIPMP, DMAG MIPAMS, AXMEDIS, DMP Chillout, OMA DRM and Sun DReaM. The following platforms were selected due to the availability of clear and open specifications or source code implementations of such specifications.
OpenSDRM is a complete DRM platform developed for a former European IST FP5 project called MOSES [4] . It has been developed to offer endto-end support to the production, distribution and consumption of protected digital objects. After the project ended, OpenSDRM has continued it's development and the source-code was provided to the open-source community to stimulate its future development. Therefore, OpenSDRM has both opensource and specifications available.
OpenIPMP [10] , is a collection of tools and services capable of delivering a robust, scalable, and adaptive infrastructure to support the management and secure delivery of media assets through each step in the asset life cycle. The value proposition is fundamental but unique in its approach: asset security and control utilizing an open framework. The "open" portion of OpenIPMP refers to its stated goal of being developed as an Open System adhering to Open Standards. Open Systems conform to industry standards enabling interaction between various hardware and software products. OpenIPMP is an open-source product and the source-code can be obtained.
DMAG MIPAMS [5] (Multimedia Information Protection and Management System) manages multimedia information using DRM and content protection. The architecture consists of several modules and services, which provide a subset of the whole system functionality needed for managing and protecting multimedia content. MIPAMS is a serviceoriented DRM platform and all its modules use the web services flexible approach. MIPAMS encompasses an important part of the content value chain, from content creation and distribution to its consumption by final users. MIPAMS is not open-source, but it has open specifications.
AXMEDIS is an European Project, aiming to create and exploit innovative technological framework for automatic production and distribution of cross-media contents over a number of different distribution channels (e.g., networked PC, PDA, kiosk, mobile phone, i-TV, etc) with DRM. For that purpose, AXMEDIS has designed and implemented a DRM architecture that consists on several independent modules that interact as web services or directly.
AXMEDIS is not open-source, but it possesses open specifications.
DMP Chillout [8] OMA DRM (Open Mobile Alliance DRM) [7] has been developed to enable the controlled consumption of digital media objects by allowing content providers the ability, for example, to manage previews of DRM Content, to enable super distribution of DRM Content, and to enable transfer of content between DRM Agents. OMA DRM has a complete set of open specifications.
Sun DReaM [9] During the analysis process conducted to the different DRM solutions, we started by looking for the key management aspects and on a second step, we look for specific key management operations.
OpenSDRM is not very well documented in terms of specifications. Some generic specifications are available, but some internal details are missing. However, from the source code analysis it is possible to extract several findings. OpenSDRM does not cover the full key management life cycle as it has been presented before. It only offers support for the user and system registration and initialization phases and also normal operation. All the subsequent phases of the key management life cycle are disregarded, especially those related to revocation and destruction of obsolete keying material. OpenSDRM is a distributed architecture with multiple components. Each of the components uses key-pairs and digital certificates to exchange securely information between them. OpenSDRM is based on both X.509 certificates and a specific certificate format based on XML. In OpenSDRM, X.509 certificates are used to authenticate the different components at the network level, using the SSL protocol, while the XML based certificates are used to establish trust relationships at the application level.
OpenIPMP is entirely based on X.509. OpenIPMP offers coverage of the same coverage of the key management life cycle than OpenSDRM, however it also includes certificate revocation, and therefore key revocation. OpenIPMP key management implementation is based on Enterprise Java Beans Certification Authority (EJBCA), a reliable Java-based J2EE Certification Authority that has the possibility not only to issue X.509 certificates but also to process certificate revocation. However, OpenIPMP does not offer support for key backup, update, archival, recovery or destruction. Therefore, similarly to other open DRM solutions, OpenIPMP key management life cycle support is not fully complete.
In the case of DMP's Chillout, the implementation of the DMP specifications are available in open-source format. The IDP specifications are quite complete and descriptive. The implementation is quite extensive, however it is not yet complete, since it is work in progress. In terms of key management and key management life cycle, both the specifications and the implementation provide very few details. From the analysis conducted to the specification and source-code it is possible to conclude that the key management life cycle is poorly covered both by the IDP specifications and by the Chillout implementation. In this implementation it is possible to observe that (like other open DRM solutions) aspects related to key archival, backup, recovery, destruction and revocation are not or poorly handled.
AXMEDIS is also based on X.509 certificates. AXMEDIS offers the same coverage of the key management life cycle than OpenIPMP, including certificate and key revocation in some specific cases, as when a client tool is detected to be corrupted. AXMEDIS also supports automatic key update when an AXMEDIS tool detects that the user or tool certificate have expired. In the case of the user certificate, the application redirects the user to the registration portal. In the case of the tool certificate, the tool is automatically re-certified after checking its integrity. AXMEDIS, like OpenIPMP, also uses EJBCA. However, AXMEDIS does not offer support for key backup, update, archival, recovery or destruction. Therefore, similarly to other open DRM solutions, AXMEDIS key management life cycle support is not complete.
OMA DRM does not have an open-source implementation available. However, the OMA DRM specifications and freely available and offer a detailed overview of the OMA DRM system and the way it should operate. From the key management point of view, the OMA DRM specifications are one of the most detailed (from the ones analyzed), covering many aspects which are usually left out scoped on other DRM solutions. These aspects includes issues like the type of cryptographic algorithms that need to be used, the format of keys and the detailed description of the protocols. OMA DRM dedicates a specific section of the overall specification to key management , where it covers aspects such as cryptographic components description, key transport mechanisms and key distribution. However, as in other specifications, a lot of assumptions are made in terms of key management and very few is said about both the key initialization and the key revocation, archival, backup and destruction. In the Sun DReaM case, both the source-code and the specifications are available. However, they are both in a very early stage of development. On what concerns specifications they are reduced to two documents that describe the Conditional Access System (CAS) and the Mother-May-I (MMI) protocol. On what concerns key management, this is an issue that is treated in a superficial manner on the specifications. They concentrate on the content encryption key protection specification, however they relegate other key management aspects to the existing of an underlying PKI solution.
DReaM is still in a very early stage of development on what concerns source-code and therefore it is hard to evaluate how much the key management life cycle is going to be implemented by Sun's DReaM final solution.
After we concluded the analysis of the selected open DRM solutions (Table 1) it is possible to observe that key management and key management life cycle are still two aspects which are not very well considered in the design and deployment of current DRM solutions.
In particular, if we consider the different stages of the key management life cycle as they were presented previously, most of the analyzed DRM solutions only offer specifications and/or implementation for the preoperational and part of the operational stages, which include User Registration, System and User initialization, key generation, key installation, key installation, key registration, and normal usage.
On what concerns the other part of the operational, post-operational and obsolete stages (including key backup, key update, archival, key de-registration and destruction, key recovery and key revocation), they are disregarded by most of the studied open DRM solutions [12] .
Conclusions and Future Work
Key management plays a fundamental role in cryptography as the basis for securing cryptographic techniques providing confidentiality, entity authentication, data origin authentication, data integrity, and digital signatures. The goal of a good cryptographic design is to reduce more complex problems to the proper management and safe-keeping of a small number of cryptographic keys, ultimately secured through trust in hardware or software by physical isolation or procedural controls.
Systems providing cryptographic services, such as DRM, require techniques for initialization and key distribution as well as protocols to support on-line update of keying material, key backup/recovery, revocation, and for managing certificates in certificatebased systems.
It is clear that key management should have a significant part to play on DRM systems. DRM systems deal with a large amount of cryptographic material that need to be properly managed to avoid security breaches. This is a very serious problem that DRM has to tackle.
In our analysis of the different open DRM systems, it was possible to conclude that although all of these had some kind of key management mechanism considered or implemented, this mechanism does not implement the full key management life cycle. In most of the cases analyzed only the pre-operational and part of the operational stages are considered.
The lack of an appropriate key management scheme in DRM could lead to some serious security problems, such as:
 the compromise of confidentiality of secret keys;  compromise of authenticity of private or public keys, and;  The unauthorized usage of private or public keys. It is therefore important, in this specific aspect to define a specific DRM function that is responsible for handling the diverse aspects of key management. This function can be used to interoperate the different specific open DRM key management requirements in a single point.
The analysis conducted to the open DRM platforms, and it focused on the high-level key management aspects of each of the platforms. However, this analysis should be further extended to perform a more detailed analysis of each of the components that compose the overall open DRM platform.
We plan to extend this analysis of the key management aspects to study how the different open DRM platforms handle license management, and to create a license management life cycle model similar to the one existing for key management.
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